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AtomEons / Learn / Cyber / Threat actors

The named threat groups

Sixteen names every cyber pro knows cold.

Threat-intel reporting and SOC alerts use these handles. Knowing which group is which — what they target, what their tradecraft looks like, who their state sponsor is — is foundational CTI and SOC knowledge. Each entry is sourced from public US government attribution, DOJ indictments, vendor research, and reputable journalism.

Public attribution only. Defensive education frame. No operational tradecraft.

State-sponsored APTs

Ten advanced-persistent-threat groups.

01

APT28 / Fancy Bear / Sofacy

Russia · GRU Unit 26165

Aliases: FANCY BEAR, STRONTIUM, PAWN STORM, Sednit

Targets: Defense, government, political organizations · Western Europe + US

Spear-phishing with X-Tunnel and X-Agent malware. Targeted the DNC in 2016 (DOJ indictment July 13, 2018). Olympic Games hack (2018). Bundestag (2015).

Sources: DOJ indictment July 13, 2018 · Mueller Report · US Treasury sanctions

02

APT29 / Cozy Bear / NobleBaron

Russia · SVR Foreign Intelligence Service

Aliases: COZY BEAR, THE DUKES, MIDNIGHT BLIZZARD, IRON HEMLOCK

Targets: Government, think tanks, healthcare, energy · long-term espionage focus

SolarWinds Orion compromise (SUNBURST backdoor, 2020). Microsoft Exchange supply chain attacks. State Department + DNC (2015-2016). Highly disciplined operational security.

Sources: Joint statement from FBI/CISA/ODNI/NSA Jan 5, 2021 · UK NCSC attribution

03

Sandworm / VOODOO BEAR / IRIDIUM

Russia · GRU Unit 74455

Aliases: VOODOO BEAR, TELEBOTS, BLACKENERGY group

Targets: Ukraine + critical infrastructure globally · destructive operations

Ukrainian power-grid attacks 2015-2016 (BlackEnergy, Industroyer). NotPetya 2017 ($10B+ damage). Olympic Destroyer 2018. Industroyer2 (April 2022 attempt on Ukraine power). Six GRU officers indicted by DOJ October 19, 2020.

Sources: DOJ indictment Oct 19, 2020 · CISA advisories · UK NCSC attribution

04

Volt Typhoon

China · MSS-attributable per US joint advisory

Aliases: VANGUARD PANDA, BRONZE SILHOUETTE

Targets: US critical infrastructure pre-positioning · telecommunications, transportation, water, energy

Living-off-the-land techniques (LOLBins, legitimate admin tools). Sustained presence rather than data exfiltration. Publicly assessed as positioning for sabotage rather than espionage. Disclosed by joint CISA/NSA/FBI advisory May 24, 2023.

Sources: CISA Advisory AA23-144A May 24, 2023 · Microsoft Threat Intelligence May 24, 2023 · FBI Director Wray testimony Jan 31, 2024

05

Salt Typhoon

China · MSS-attributable per US reporting

Aliases: EARTH ESTRIES, GhostEmperor

Targets: US telecommunications carriers · lawful-intercept systems

Long-running compromise of major US telcos (AT&T, Verizon, Lumen confirmed publicly). Accessed lawful-intercept infrastructure used for court-authorized wiretaps. Government communications affected including phones of senior officials per public reporting.

Sources: Joint FBI + CISA statement late 2024 · WSJ + WaPo investigative reporting 2024

06

APT41 / BARIUM / WICKED PANDA

China · MSS contractor with criminal moonlighting

Aliases: BARIUM, BRONZE ATLAS, WICKED PANDA

Targets: Healthcare, telecommunications, technology, gaming · espionage + financial crime hybrid

Unique dual-use group. State-sponsored espionage by day, criminal financial operations by night. Five Chinese nationals indicted by DOJ September 16, 2020. SolarWinds-adjacent activity. Targets gaming platforms for virtual currency theft.

Sources: DOJ indictment Sep 16, 2020 · Mandiant APT41 reports · CrowdStrike WICKED PANDA reports

07

Lazarus Group / HIDDEN COBRA

North Korea · Reconnaissance General Bureau

Aliases: HIDDEN COBRA, ZINC, LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA, APT38 (financial sub-group)

Targets: Banks (especially SWIFT), cryptocurrency exchanges, entertainment industry · revenue generation for DPRK

Bangladesh Bank heist 2016 ($81M via SWIFT). WannaCry 2017. Sony Pictures 2014. Multiple $100M+ cryptocurrency heists (Axie Infinity $620M in March 2022). Treasury OFAC sanctioned.

Sources: DOJ indictment Park Jin Hyok Sep 6, 2018 · DOJ indictment three DPRK nationals Feb 17, 2021 · Treasury OFAC designations

08

APT34 / OilRig / Helix Kitten

Iran · MOIS Ministry of Intelligence

Aliases: OILRIG, HELIX KITTEN, CRAMBUS

Targets: Middle East government + financial + energy · gradual expansion to Western targets

DNS-based command-and-control. Custom backdoors (Helminth, Quadagent). Long-term reconnaissance focus. Aramco-related activity (2017). Active 2014-present.

Sources: FireEye/Mandiant APT34 reports · Microsoft Threat Intelligence

09

APT33 / Elfin / Refined Kitten

Iran · IRGC-attributable per multiple sources

Aliases: ELFIN, REFINED KITTEN, MAGNALLIUM

Targets: Saudi aerospace + petrochemicals + Western energy

Spear-phishing with malicious Excel attachments. Destructive Shamoon and StoneDrill malware history (with related/overlapping groups). Industrial control systems targeting.

Sources: FireEye APT33 reports · Symantec Elfin reports · CISA advisories

10

Equation Group

US-attributable per public researcher consensus and Shadow Brokers leak

Aliases: (no public alternate handles)

Targets: Foreign intelligence + counterintelligence operations

Most technically sophisticated public threat actor. Pre-Stuxnet ancestor of Olympic Games. EternalBlue exploit (later leaked by Shadow Brokers and weaponized into WannaCry / NotPetya). Firmware-level persistence on hard drives. Identified by Kaspersky research 2015.

Sources: Kaspersky Equation Group reports 2015 · Shadow Brokers leaks 2016-2017 · Snowden NSA documents

Criminal crews + ransomware operations

Six financially-motivated groups.

The criminal vs state-actor line is increasingly blurry — multiple ransomware crews have Russian state tolerance or implicit protection. Six groups every cyber professional should recognize.

01

LockBit

Ransomware-as-a-Service · primary operator and affiliate network

Targets: Manufacturing, healthcare, government, professional services · global

Most prolific ransomware operation 2022-2024. RaaS model with disciplined affiliate program. Operation Cronos (international LE takedown Feb 2024) seized infrastructure but operations continued. Russian-language ecosystem.

Sources: UK NCA Operation Cronos Feb 20, 2024 · DOJ indictments Dmitry Khoroshev May 7, 2024 · CISA #StopRansomware advisories

02

ALPHV / BlackCat

Ransomware-as-a-Service · Rust-based ransomware

Targets: Healthcare (Change Healthcare 2024 was their work), critical infrastructure, energy

First major Rust-language ransomware. Change Healthcare attack ($22M ransom confirmed paid). Vanished March 2024 in apparent exit scam after Change Healthcare payment. Members may have re-emerged in other RaaS operations.

Sources: FBI/CISA #StopRansomware ALPHV advisory · UnitedHealth congressional testimony 2024

03

Cl0p / TA505

Ransomware + data-extortion · zero-day exploitation specialty

Targets: Mass-exploitation of file-transfer software vulnerabilities · global

MOVEit Transfer mass-exploitation 2023 (~2,500 organizations). GoAnywhere MFT 2023. Accellion FTA 2020. Strategy is zero-day on widely-used software, then mass-data-extraction-and-extortion (sometimes without encryption).

Sources: CISA #StopRansomware Cl0p advisory June 7, 2023 · Mandiant FIN11 reports · DOJ indictments

04

REvil / Sodinokibi

Ransomware-as-a-Service · disrupted but ancestor of multiple successors

Targets: Managed service providers (MSPs), large enterprises · Kaseya VSA July 2021

Kaseya VSA supply-chain ransomware July 2021 affecting 1,500+ downstream organizations. JBS Foods ransom $11M paid June 2021. Russian authorities announced arrests of REvil members January 2022 (subsequent proceedings unclear).

Sources: FBI Kaseya advisory · DOJ press release ransom recovery · Russian FSB statement Jan 14, 2022

05

FIN7 / Carbanak Group

Financial cybercrime · POS targeting · ransomware pivot

Targets: Hospitality, retail, restaurants · POS systems and payment data

Sophisticated multi-year fraud operation. Operated front company Combi Security as fake penetration-testing firm to recruit unwitting attackers. Multiple convictions 2018-2022. Pivoted to ransomware affiliates including (allegedly) DarkSide/BlackMatter.

Sources: DOJ indictments and convictions multiple, 2018-2022 · FBI press releases · Mandiant FIN7 reports

06

Scattered Spider / UNC3944 / Octo Tempest

Social engineering + ransomware · English-speaking · younger operator profile

Targets: Las Vegas casinos (Caesars, MGM, Sep 2023), telecommunications, BPO services

Sophisticated social engineering of IT help desks. SIM-swapping. Native English speakers — significant departure from Russian-language ecosystem norm. MGM Resorts 2023 ($100M cost). Caesars 2023 ($15M ransom paid).

Sources: Microsoft Threat Intelligence Octo Tempest reports · FBI press releases · Mandiant UNC3944 reports

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